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Abstract
We survey an emerging literature at the intersection of organizational economics and
international trade. We argue that a proper modelling of the organizational aspects of
production provides valuable insights on the aggregate workings of the world economy.
In reviewing the literature, we describe certain predictions of standard models that are
a⁄ected or even overturned when organizational decisions are brought into the analysis.
We also suggest potentially fruitful areas for future research.
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assistance.1 Introduction
As in standard general equilibrium theory, the three central primitives of traditional and new
trade theory are consumer preferences, factor endowments, and the production technologies
that allow ￿rms to transform factors of production into consumer goods. As parsimonious as
these frameworks are, they have generated some particularly sharp theorems in economics.
However, a limitation of these theories is that the speci￿cation of technology treats the
mapping between factors of production and ￿nal goods as a black box. In practice, this
mapping is determined by the decisions of agents in organizations.
The growing ￿eld of ￿ Organizational Economics￿is devoted to the study of how these
organizational decisions shape the mapping between factors of production and consumer
goods. An understanding of these microeconomic decisions may be intellectually interesting
in its own right: for instance, there is a vast literature trying to understand why certain
transactions are carried out within ￿rms and others across ￿rms. In this article, we attempt
to convey the notion that studying these organizational decisions provides valuable insights
for the aggregate workings of the world economy, and thus the importance of organizational
economics transcends the narrow nature of some of the questions it seeks to answer. Only
by microfounding the origin and properties of production functions can one fully under-
stand how changes in the economic environment, such as falling trade or communication
costs or improvements in contract enforcement, will a⁄ect economic outcomes. The classi-
cal, reduced-form approach to production technologies will naturally miss the endogenous
response of organizations to these changes in the economic environment. We will illustrate
the importance of this omission by describing a few predictions of standard models that
are dramatically a⁄ected or even overturned when organizational decisions are brought into
the analysis. As an example, the slicing of the value chain across countries can radically
alter the predicted e⁄ects of trade integration on relative factor rewards in both developed
and developing economies. Also, we shall see how the internalization decision of ￿rms can
signi￿cantly a⁄ect the overall pattern of multinational ￿rm activity around the world.
Although our survey will avoid dwelling into many technical details, it is worth providing a
brief formalization of the common theme in the literature we will review. Consider a standard
de￿nition of a production function in a country c given by Fc (L), where L denotes a vector of
traditional inputs (di⁄erent types of labor and capital, land, etc.).1 The main characteristic of
these inputs is that their supply is determined outside the production process. For example,
aggregate labor supply decisions are made by agents in response to the wages prevailing
1For simplicity, we abstract here from intermediate inputs. Of course, the use and form of production of
certain intermediate goods or services is part of the organizational problem. However, these intermediate
goods and services are themselves produced by traditional inputs.
1in the economy, not as part of the production process of a ￿rm. Fc (L) then denotes the
output that can be produced using a set of inputs L in a certain location c. The assumption
that the speci￿cation and parameters of Fc (￿) are given by technology and are independent
of the economic environment assumes away the organizational problem. Now suppose that
￿rms can decide which inputs to use and how to combine them. For example, they can
decide to buy some intermediate inputs and produce only part of the production process
themselves: an outsourcing decision. The optimal decision on how to produce will determine
the characteristics of the function Fc (￿) and will make those characteristics a function of,
potentially, all prices and properties of the economy. Summarize these prices and properties
by E. Then the problem of organization becomes one in which the traditional notion of
technology is modi￿ed to a reduced-form speci￿cation given by Oc (L;E). Understanding
how this production function depends on the characteristics of the economy, namely how the
function Oc (￿) relates to the function Fc (￿), is the goal of organizational theories.2
The key distinction we make in this survey between the ￿ general￿production problem and
the organizational problem is that the organizational problem includes only the decisions that
shape how a product is produced. The ￿ general￿production problem encompasses both the
decisions of what to produce and how to produce it. We therefore think of an organization
as all the agents (a ￿rm, a group of ￿rms, or one or several individuals) that participate
in a particular production process, given the product itself and its characteristics. As such,
the organizational problem includes the decisions of where to locate the di⁄erent parts of
the production process, what type of agents and capital to employ, and whether to produce
things in one single ￿rm or outsource part of the production process. These dimensions will
guide the ordering of the literature that we propose below.3
Trade and organizations are obviously related in as far as the ability to produce part of the
production process in di⁄erent locations determines the characteristics of the organizational
problem and the function Oc (￿). The ability to trade has traditionally been understood, from
a country￿ s perspective, as an expansion in the production possibility frontier, since trade
can be viewed as an alternative technology to produce the imported goods. In the same way,
the ability to organize the production process using foreign factors, technology, institutions,
etc. determines the organization of the production process, and therefore the implied ￿ pro-
ductivity￿of this process. Of course, this link between the organization of production and the
2Note that the speci￿cation of the function Oc (L;E) is in general endogenous in organizational theories.
However, it is still the case that theories impose many restrictions on the way this function can depend on
the characteristics of the economy.
3The decision of the number and type of products to produce is, according to our de￿nition, not an
organizational decision. In general, this decision has been studied in frameworks that emphasize ￿rm het-
erogeneity and so we will abstain from discussing it. The interested reader should go to Bernard, Redding
and Schott (2006) and Nocke and Yeaple (2008).
2ability to incorporate foreign factors and foreign characteristics in the production process via
￿ trade￿has important consequences for welfare. Many of the papers we will review discuss
the particular welfare and factor-price implications of this link.
Combining trade theories with organizational theories yields many new predictions in
both ￿elds. By incorporating organizational theories into general equilibrium trade models,
the literature has obtained a variety of aggregate predictions from these particular ways of
understanding the production process. For example, the ability to organize the production
process across countries can change the pattern of comparative advantage, and therefore
the pattern of trade. Not only are trade models richer and more ￿ exible by incorporating
organizational decisions, but organizational theories also gain in richness of predictions and
testable implications. For instance, by moving away from the traditional partial-equilibrium,
￿rm-level approaches in organizational economics, some of the papers we will discuss unveil
interesting complementarities in the organizational decisions of ￿rms.
Also important in explaining the success and impact of this recent literature is the fact
that data on international transactions is particularly accessible: more data on FDI, multi-
national ￿rms, related party trade, etc. is becoming available every day. This makes the
international dimension of the organization decisions of ￿rms a good candidate to empiri-
cally explore the predictions of organizational theories, and gain insights into their aggregate
importance in the economy.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections and a ￿nal section with con-
cluding remarks. In dividing the literature into these four sections we have tried to follow
a logic that, hopefully, will help the reader. In particular, we have moved progressively
from theories that remove certain traditional frictions from classical theories (such as the
ability to fragment production or trade tasks), to theories that introduce non-traditional
frictions (such as contractual frictions) in order to be able to determine how organizations
break down into particular entities, like ￿rms. As a result, the ￿rst two sections discuss only
the international organization of production and are rich in aggregate predictions, but have
nothing to say about the break down of this international organization of production into
￿rms. In contrast, the last two sections introduce contractual frictions in order to have a rich
set of predictions on the way the organization of production is broken down into national
and multinational ￿rms. Inevitably, these models sacri￿ce on the richness of the type of
organizations considered and on their general equilibrium implications. Of course, these two
literatures are complementary and have been developed, to a large extent, in parallel.
In Section 2, we will review a body of work that models the international fragmentation
of production across borders in otherwise neoclassical models. Despite the fact that these
theories in general share the frictionless environment with traditional theories, we will argue
3that the organizational choices inherent in the international slicing of the value chain can
have dramatic consequences for the workings of general-equilibrium models.
In Section 3, we will discuss a literature that further departs from traditional models
by relaxing the assumptions that the set of tasks involved in production is ￿xed, and that
factors of production of the same type (say unskilled workers or skilled workers) are perfect
substitutes (in e¢ ciency units) from each other. This leads to a nontrivial matching problem
between factors of production, which can be interpreted as the organizational design of the
production process.
In Section 4, we will focus on a particular organization decision of ￿rms that has re-
ceived a lot of attention in recent research, namely, the internalization decision of ￿rms.4
As we shall discuss, trade statistics have unveiled certain systematic patterns regarding
the way that production is being fragmented across borders within and across ￿rms. Be-
cause a rationalization of these stylized facts requires a formal model of why some tasks are
done within ￿rms, it cannot be provided by complete-contracting frameworks of the type
used in traditional theories of international trade. Hence a recent literature has developed
general-equilibrium models of multinational production that draw ￿rm boundaries through
incomplete contracting.
Finally, in Section 5, we will brie￿ y comment on a few other contributions that have
studied the e⁄ect of contractual frictions for organizational decisions other than the inter-
nalization decision. Section 6 concludes by o⁄ering some suggestions for future research in
this ￿eld.
2 Fragmentation in Otherwise Neoclassical Models
Production of a good involves the performance of a set of activities. These di⁄erent parts of
the production process have been labeled tasks, intermediate goods or vertical production
stages. In all cases, the main idea in the papers reviewed in this section is that the production
process used by ￿rms can be decomposed into these smaller units. None of these studies
has anything meaningful to say about the boundaries of the ￿rm; they focus only on the
organization of the international production process.
Explicitly recognizing the multi-staged nature of production in models of international
trade has been important since the economic environment (e.g. trade costs, information
and communication technology, factor prices, etc.) can shape where and how these di⁄erent
tasks or stages of production are performed. In this sense, the possibility, for example, of
performing these stages in di⁄erent countries a⁄ects the organization of production. That
4See Helpman (2006) and Spencer (2005) for recent, alternative reviews of this literature.
4is, it a⁄ects the reduced form production function (the way in which factors of production
are transformed into goods) used by ￿rms in di⁄erent countries. The possibility to ￿ trade￿
these tasks or perform the stages in a di⁄erent location can have important e⁄ects on the
measured productivity of ￿rms (as pointed out initially by Jones and Kierkowski, 2001),
on the identity of the industries in which countries have comparative advantage (Dixit and
Grossman, 1982, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007, and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg,
2008a), and on the implications of trade liberalization or reductions of trade costs on factor
prices (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008a, and Rodr￿guez-Clare, 2007). By a⁄ecting the
location in which each part of the production process is done, trade determines organization,
and by determining the way in which the production of these stages determines the ￿ reduced
form￿production function, organization determines trade ￿ ows. Dixit and Grossman (1982)
is the ￿rst paper to study this organizational decision in a trade model with a continuum of
tasks that di⁄er in their capital-labor ratios.
The unbundling of the production process has been a constant object of study in inter-
national trade also because of the ubiquitousness of intermediate good trade and o⁄shoring.
Many empirical papers have documented pieces of evidence that point to the unbundling
of the production process (see Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007, for a good discussion of
the literature, and Hummels, Ishii and Yi, 2001, and Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter, 2005
for nice attempts to measure this phenomenon).5 More of these ￿ stages￿of production are
being done in distinct countries, and so the share of value added of any given country in
a particular product has been going down in the last 30 years. Economists have pointed
to the role of improvements in communication and transportation technology in explaining
these phenomena. As these technologies improve, it becomes more economical to fragment
the production process to take advantage of cross-country di⁄erences in the cost of per-
forming the necessary tasks, or producing the required intermediate goods. As Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008a) argue, reductions in communication and trade costs imply that
by ￿ trading tasks￿or ￿ unbundling￿the production process, ￿rms or organizations can enjoy
the productivity bene￿ts of worker specialization without sacri￿cing the gains from locating
production in the most economical location.
The e⁄ect of ￿ unbundling￿the production process, as labeled by Baldwin (2006), has been
compared to the e⁄ect of improvements in technology. Jones and Kierkowski (1990, 2001)
study a standard factor abundance Hecksher-Ohlin framework with two industries and two
factors in which initially production has to be done in only one stage. At some point in
5There are many problems in measuring the fragmentation of production. Three of the most salient ones
are that trade statistics are collected in terms of total value instead of value added, that they tend to insert
both ￿nal goods and intermediate inputs in the same (￿nely disaggregated) industry categories, and that
some of the traded tasks may not be accurately measured (e.g., managerial tasks).
5time, it becomes feasible to fragment the production process in two intermediate goods with
di⁄erent factor intensities within an industry. These stages can be done in distinct countries.
Firms will take advantage of this possibility if the two stages have factor intensities that are
di⁄erent enough. The possibility to trade these intermediate stages in an industry is similar
to an improvement in total factor productivity in that same industry. The analogy is helpful
because much is known about the e⁄ect of Hicks neutral technological change in Hecksher-
Ohlin models (the early contributions are Findlay and Grubert, 1959, and Jones, 1965). All
the standard results apply, so fragmentation leads to overall gains from trade but, in most
cases, generates distributional con￿ ict. This is similar to the e⁄ect of reductions in trade
barriers in the standard Hecksher-Ohlin model. The ability to fragment production can lead,
when trading with a poor country that is abundant in unskilled labor, to decreases in the
low-skilled workers￿wage and to increases in the high-skilled workers￿wage. Arndt (1997),
Egger and Falkinger (2003), and Kohler (2004a,b) extend this analysis in several directions.
In particular, they add the possibility to fragment production in both industries.6
Yi (2003) introduces a technology with three sequential stages of production. The em-
phasis here, relative to Jones and Kierkowski (1990) and similar papers, is the assumption
that the stages of production have to been done sequentially (see Hummels, Rapoport and
Yi, 1998, for evidence on this assumption). The ￿rst two stages can be produced o⁄shore
but it is assumed that the third needs to be produced close to the ￿rm headquarters. He
shows that multistage production is important to account for the large increase in trade
￿ ows relative to GDP in the second half of the 20th century. The reason is that as tari⁄s
and other forms of transport costs of intermediate goods go down, ￿rms choose to do more
stages abroad, which increases trade. Tari⁄s have an ampli￿ed e⁄ect on trade because they
apply to the gross value of the product, not to the value that was added abroad. So a ￿rm
that decides to produce the second stage abroad (thus importing it from a subsidiary or
an independent supplier) might also need to pay tari⁄s on the value it added in the ￿rst
stage, even when the latter was done in the home country. This is a clear example of how
an endogenous response of the international organization of production to trade policy can
have an important e⁄ect on the volume of trade. In a follow up paper, Yi (2008) uses the
same idea to estimate trade costs. Multistage production implies that smaller trade costs
are needed to explain the lack of international trade relative to national trade (sometime
referred to as the ￿ border e⁄ect￿ ). Since measured trade costs are too small to account for
the volume of trade, this ￿nding highlights the importance of accounting for this element of
the organization of production.
One of the drawbacks of this literature is that the possibilities to fragment production, and
6See also Deardor⁄ (2001a,b).
6the characteristics of each fragment (e.g., factor intensities) are exogenous. These exogenous
characteristics of the di⁄erent stages drive most of the results. So the literature has produced
a taxonomy of examples in which a whole variety of outcomes are possible depending on the
precise way in which fragmentation is introduced. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008a)
avoid this by assuming that production requires a continuum of tasks from each factor of
production. So low skilled workers perform a continuum of tasks and high skilled workers
perform another continuum of distinct tasks. All tasks are required to produce the good and
each task can be done domestically or abroad. Doing the task o⁄shore (in a di⁄erent location
than the ￿rm￿ s headquarters) requires paying a cost that di⁄ers by task. Thus, some tasks
can be produced o⁄shore easily (like basic manufacturing tasks), while others are very hard
or impossible to produce o⁄shore (like local transportation). Which tasks are o⁄shored is
part of the production decisions of the ￿rm. The result is a production process that can be
embedded in standard trade models to study the impact of the costs of o⁄shoring parts of
the production process.
In a Hecksher-Ohlin context, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008a) show that reduc-
tions in the average cost to o⁄shore tasks performed by a given factor have analogous e⁄ects
to factor-augmenting technological change in that factor. Note the di⁄erence with the pre-
vious literature. Since in this case tasks are produced with one factor, reductions in the
cost of o⁄shoring lead to factor augmenting technological change instead of Hicks neutral
technological change in that industry. This implies that reductions in the cost of o⁄shoring
low-skilled tasks can lead to gains for all factors of production. Low skilled workers become
more ￿ productive￿in the skill abundant country, because they combine their output with
the cheaper tasks produced by foreigners. This e⁄ect (which they label ￿ the productivity
e⁄ect￿ ) bene￿ts low skill workers in the skill abundant country. Of course, the standard
Stolper-Samuelson e⁄ects identi￿ed in traditional trade models are still present, so the ￿nal
impact on low skill workers is uncertain.7
All of the studies above focus on the organization of production between countries that
have either di⁄erent technologies or di⁄erent factor endowments. Tasks are performed o⁄-
shore because they can be done cheaper or more productively in another country and the
costs of producing them abroad are not too large. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) dis-
cuss the case in which countries have di⁄erent technologies to produce particular tasks, but
similar overall levels of technology. Then, countries can have similar aggregate total factor
productivity and still trade ￿ tasks￿ . They show that, as in standard Ricardian trade models,
7Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) and Verhoogen (2008) study quality upgrading as a result of the
fragmentation of production and analyze empirically the impact on foreign factor prices. Although these
are important empirical studies, they do not study the formation and behavior of organizations, but instead
focus on product selection.
7countries specialize in the production of particular tasks. Otherwise they argue that the basic
insights of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008a) survive this generalization. Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008b) study the pattern of specialization across tasks between countries
that are identical except, perhaps, for their size. They introduce external increasing returns
at the task level as the source of agglomeration and show that, in general, the larger country
in terms of output will have higher wages and specialize in the tasks that are relatively more
costly to o⁄shore.
These theories are all static and focus on the organizational problem as related to the
international organization of production and trade. None of them studies the dynamics of
technology or factor accumulation and how they change as the international organization of
production changes. This is an area that clearly requires a lot more work. It is easy to argue
that, as the international organization of production involves more locations, technology
transfers to these countries change the production possibilities of these countries in the
future, or the incentives people have to acquire a better education or particular practical
skills. Rodr￿guez-Clare (2007) is a ￿rst e⁄ort in this direction. It uses an Eaton and Kortum
(2002) setup embedded in a quality-ladder growth model. It then introduces o⁄shoring and
analyzes the impact that reductions in o⁄shoring costs may have on growth. He shows that
while the rich country always gains from a reduction in o⁄shoring costs in the long run, the
poor country may reduce research e⁄ort and therefore su⁄er in the long run. Of course, these
insights depend crucially on the particular assumptions used to model the research sector
and the potential technological transfers across countries. Hence, although the analysis is
intriguing, few ￿nal results have been advanced at this stage.8
3 Matching and Factor Heterogeneity
In the previous section we discussed theories of organization and trade that allow ￿rms to
trade the ￿ tasks￿performed in production. The set of required tasks was, however, ￿xed
by assumption. The literature reviewed in this section endogenizes this decision of ￿ how￿to
produce, as well as the decision of what exact factors to use in production. In the previous set
of papers, the number of factors was small, normally two. Factor heterogeneity was not an
element of those theories. As theories go deeper into the decision of how to produce, choosing
among heterogenous factors becomes an important part of this decision. A ￿rm can decide
8Recently, Monge-Naranjo (2008) studied the e⁄ect of multinational production on growth via knowledge
transfers to local agents that may be internal or external to the ￿rm. His paper is a nice attempt at
understanding this important problem, but more empirical and theoretical research is needed to understand
how multinational ￿rm and individual worker characteristics shape the transmission of knowledge in source
countries, and what are the aggregate implications of this di⁄usion of knowledge.
8to produce using a few very talented individuals and many not so talented assistants or it
can hire workers with similar talents. Which option dominates will depend on technology
(whether technology is sub or super-modular as explained by Grossman and Maggi, 2000)
and on the distribution of talent in the population. Keeping constant the mean of the
distribution, a very dispersed distribution of talent (with many very skilled and unskilled
individuals), will favor the ￿rst type of organization, as agents with intermediate talent will
be relatively expensive.
The key requirements on technology for the distribution of skills in the population to
matter for the organization of production is for it to exhibit skill complementarity, imperfect
substitutability between workers￿skill, and di⁄erential sensitivity to the skill of di⁄erent
workers (as discussed in Kremer and Maskin, 1996).9 A production technology exhibits skill
complementarity if better teammates increase the marginal product of a worker. Imperfect
substitutability implies that workers with di⁄erent skills perform di⁄erent roles in production.
In contrast to the theories reviewed in the previous section, it is not the number of units of
skill, but how they are distributed across agents within the production team, that determines
output. Finally, marginal increases in worker skill have to lead to di⁄erential marginal
increases in output. Again this is consistent with the notion that di⁄erent workers perform
di⁄erent roles in production and so the marginal value of their skills, conditional on their
teammates, di⁄ers. Any technology that satis￿es these three basic requirements will lead to
a non-trivial organizational problem in which ￿rms will have to decide whom to hire and
therefore how to produce.
Perhaps the most basic organizational problem is the one introduced by Lucas (1978).
Lucas (1978) assumes that all agents in the economy are heterogenous in their ability to
manage, but that all of them are identical as workers. He assumes a production function
of the form AF (n) where A is the ability of the one manager employed by the ￿rm (or the
entrepreneur) and n is the chosen number of workers. F (￿) is assumed to be increasing and
concave in the number of workers (other factors could be added as well as long as the func-
tion still exhibits diminishing returns to all factors). Note that since everyone is homogenous
as a worker, the ability of workers does not enter the production function directly, but the
ability of the manager does. Of course, one could think of the ability of workers as deter-
mining the level of F (￿); which is assumed constant across ￿rms. Lucas (1978) studies the
equilibrium occupational decisions that result from an exogenous distribution of managerial
skill in the population. Clearly, his technology does not exhibit skill complementarity: the
9See Legros and Newman (2002) for a nice discussion of the theory of one-to-one matching in equilibrium
models and Sattinger (1993) for a review of the use of matching to study labor markets and how to incorporate
matching into simple general equilibrium models.
9ability of the individual that works as manager does a⁄ect the productivity of workers, but
the ability as managers of workers does not a⁄ect the productivity of the manager. The lack
of complementarity implies that there is no well determined matching problem and so the
characteristics of the workers that sort into each team is indeterminate (and irrelevant). In
this case, the organizational problem reduces to an occupational choice problem. Burstein
and Monge-Naranjo (2008) embed this model into a Ricardian international trade model in
which home managers can produce abroad. In their case, the productivity of a ￿rm is deter-
mined multiplicatively by the ability of the manager, and the characteristics of the country
in which they hire workers. Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2008) uses the model to explore
quantitatively the role of this type of cross-country team formation and ￿nds very large
negative welfare e⁄ects from eliminating this form of o⁄shoring. Particularly interesting is
the fact that they can control for local productivity using their theoretical model.
Grossman and Maggi (2000) study a world with two countries and two industries. One
of the industries combines the two tasks required for production with a supermodular tech-
nology (essentially equivalent to a positive cross-derivative of the production function with
respect to the level of the two tasks), and the other with a submodular one (essentially a
negative cross-derivative). This means that in the sector with a supermodular technology
￿rms want individuals of the same type. That is, in equilibrium workers match with others
like themselves. In contrast, in the submodular industry ￿rms want (given equilibrium fac-
tor prices) to combine low and high skilled individuals so there is maximal cross-matching.
The result is an allocation in which, in each country, the extreme types (the most and least
skilled) are matched with each other, and the intermediate types self-match. Grossman and
Maggi (2000) show that if the variance of the skill distribution varies across countries, but
the distributions are symmetric with a common mean, the country with higher variance will
have comparative advantage in the submodular sector. This paper is a nice example of how
the organization of production can a⁄ect comparative advantage through the distribution of
skills. Note how in this theory the organization of production interacts with a rich set of
factor markets to lead to the discussed outcome.
Although undoubtedly very insightful and novel, the analysis has some limitations. Im-
portantly, they assume that matching is one-to-one. Namely, a production process matches
only two individuals; one of each type. Hence, the organization of production involves only
the talent allocation problem, and no organizational design on top of it. In particular, it is
hard to interpret one of the workers as a manager with several subordinates. The analysis is
also limited by the fact that the distributions of skill across countries have to be symmetric
and di⁄er only in their variance (or diversity as de￿ned in their paper).
Kremer and Maskin (2006) is the ￿rst paper to introduce the formation of international
10teams (since in Grossman and Maggi, 2000, all teams are national and economies trade
￿nal goods). They present a model in which two agents with di⁄erent skills can match and
produce in a team. Their model uses a Cobb-Douglas production function with coe¢ cients
that sum to more than one and are di⁄erent for the two skills. This technology satis￿es the
three requirements to have matching. The paper studies the type of international matches
that can form in a world with workers of several skills and the wages that workers will
command depending on the characteristics of technology and the supply of the di⁄erent
worker￿ s types. The paper provides a useful taxonomy of the possible cases (self-matching,
cross-matching, etc.) but does little to discriminate between them. As Grossman and Maggi
(2000), it considers only teams with two agents (one-to-one matching). Particularly useful
is the discussion of the necessary properties of the technology to have non-trivial matching.
Antr￿s, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) use the hierarchical technology introduced
in Garicano (2000)￿ and developed in general equilibrium with heterogenous agents in Gar-
icano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004, 2006)￿ to study the impact of the formation of cross-
country teams on the organization of production and wages. A continuum of heterogenous
agents in two countries form production teams in which there is one manager and several
workers. The production function di⁄ers from the Lucas (1978) type technology discussed
above in that the span of control (the number of workers per manager) depends on the
ability of the workers.10 This implies that the technology exhibits complementarity between
worker￿ s skills, which in turn leads to positive assortative matching (remember than in Lucas￿
model there is no matching as worker￿ s skills are irrelevant). More generally, the production
function exhibits all the properties discussed in Kremer and Maskin (1996), but it adds team
production where one manager is matched to many workers. Hence, in equilibrium there is
a skill level below which all agents are workers and above which all agents are managers.
Furthermore, complementarity implies positive assortative matching, so the best managers
form teams with the best workers. Of course, to the extent that countries have di⁄erent
distributions of skills, if managers can form teams with foreign workers, some will. Whether
it is the best or worse managers who form these teams depends on the characteristics of the
distribution of skills in both countries. If the north is much more skilled than the south, the
worst managers in the north are the ones that form these international teams. Independently
of the skill overlap (the range of skills available in both countries when the distributions are
assumed uniform), the paper shows that globalization (i.e., the formation of these interna-
tional teams) implies a reduction in the measure of managers in the relatively skill scarce
country. The paper also shows that this reorganization of international production will in-
10In the theory, workers with more knowledge can solve more problems on their own and therefore use less
managerial time as they request help less often.
11crease wage inequality in the south, as observed in the data11, and will have an ambiguous
e⁄ect on wage inequality in the north.12 Essentially, good workers in the south bene￿t from
the possibility of being matched with better managers in the north. Northern wage inequal-
ity can go up if the north is much more skilled and communication technology is particularly
good, so the span of control of managers is large.
Antr￿s, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) is the ￿rst international trade model to in-
troduce hierarchical one-to-many matching (rather than one-to-one matching), where a man-
ager is endogenously matched with a potentially large number of workers, and the identity
of managers and workers is endogenous. Furthermore, the actual team production function
results from a micro-founded model of worker specialization in production and knowledge,
where the relation between the skill of the manager and that of the worker is mediated by
communication technology. An important limitation of the analysis is that most of it is
restricted to uniform distributions of skill in both countries. Some of this analysis can be
extended easily to more general distributions, but more research on generalizing some these
results is needed.13
In a follow up paper, Antr￿s, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) takes this framework
one step further and analyzes the possibility of multi-layered production teams; namely,
teams with more than one layer of managers. In particular it analyzes the case where inter-
national teams can have up to three layers. The exercise allows ￿rms to change the number
of layers as a response to the economic circumstances and the possibility to organize abroad
part of the production process. The paper shows that ￿rms with workers abroad may want
to add a layer of managers in the foreign country to deal with simple locally-generated prob-
lems; thereby economizing on international communication costs. Whether they decide to
introduce this extra layer depends on the di⁄erence between local and international commu-
nication technologies, and the opportunities of managers in foreign countries to start their
own ￿rms.
Understanding the process of introducing and eliminating layers is, we believe, an im-
portant topic for future research. Much has been said about the role of information and
communication technology in ￿ ￿ attening the organization,￿understood as a reduction in the
number of management layers in organizations (see for example Rajan and Wulf, 2006 and
Caroli and van Reenen, 2001, among others). The process of introducing new layers to deal
11See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) for a survey of the empirical literature on the e⁄ect of globalization
on wage inequality in developing countries.
12See Feenstra and Hanson (1999) for evidence consistent with this prediction.
13Ohnsorge and Tre￿ er (2007), Costinot (2008) and Costinot and Vogel (2008) also introduce worker
heterogeneity in standard trade models, but focus on the sorting of workers into industries rather than the
matching between di⁄erent types of workers. Hence, they abstract from the organizational problem.
12with the international organization of production has been less studied empirically. As this
form of reorganization of production is relatively easy to observe and may have large e⁄ects
on organizational structure, understanding it seems important to determine the costs and
bene￿ts of international production.
Finally, Nocke and Yeaple (2008) present an assignment model of FDI, but focus on
the matching between brands of di⁄erent quality and entrepreneurs of heterogeneous ability.
Their analysis is the ￿rst to study, in a matching context, the decision of ￿rms to set up or
buy the plants they use to produce abroad. As building a new plant abroad is assumed to
imply ￿xed costs, but the value of existing plants is proportional to their productivity and
output (and therefore the marginal cost of production), the more productive ￿rms (the ones
that ultimately have a larger scale) are the ones that do ￿ green￿eld FDI￿ ; that is, are the
ones that build new plants.
4 Contractual Frictions and Multinational Firm Bound-
aries
The theoretical models that we have reviewed so far enhance our understanding of trade
and FDI ￿ ows, but they are not able to properly draw the boundaries of multinational ￿rms
(MNEs). Some of the models identify a potential gain to fragment production across borders
or to use managerial know-how in a foreign country, but they are not designed to explain
why these activities will occur within ￿rm boundaries (thus involving foreign insourcing or
FDI), rather than through arm￿ s length subcontracting, licensing, or outsourcing. As such,
they are not theories of the multinational ￿rm, but theories of the international organization
of production.
There is a vast literature in economics that has focused on studying the ￿rm-level deci-
sions of ￿rms related to the mode of servicing a foreign market or the (￿rm-level) division of
stages of production across countries. Markusen (1984) introduced the so-called ￿ proximity-
concentration￿trade-o⁄ between exporting and multinational activity. Relative to export-
ing, servicing a foreign market through a local a¢ liate that replicates the home production
process abroad may be appealing because it saves on transportation costs (due to proximity
to demand). In the presence of increasing returns to scale, exporting may however prove
to be more pro￿table because it provides the bene￿ts associated with concentrating produc-
tion in a single location.14 A complementary approach was developed by Helpman (1984),
who showed that, in the presence of factor price di⁄erences across countries and increasing
14This ￿ horizontal￿approach to MNEs has been extended and empirically tested, among others, by Brainard
(1997), Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), and Ramondo (2007).
13returns to scale in the production of ￿ headquarter services￿(e.g., management know-how,
distribution, product-speci￿c R&D), a producer may ￿nd it optimal to fragment the pro-
duction process and undertake headquarter services and certain manufacturing processes in
di⁄erent countries. Quite naturally, Helpman￿ s (1984) model predicts that measures of the
extent of MNE activity should be increasing in relative factor endowment di⁄erences across
countries.15
These technological theories of the multinational ￿rm have provided valuable insights
for how MNE activity a⁄ects the structure of trade ￿ ows, factor price di⁄erences, and the
di⁄usion of technology across countries.16 Nevertheless, they continue to assume that when
fragmentation or replication across borders is pro￿table, it will be undertaken within ￿rm
boundaries. In practice, one of the key organizational decisions of ￿rms is the so-called
internalization decision. This is nothing more than the classical ￿ make-or-buy￿decision in
industrial organization, but it naturally also applies in an international context. For example,
when in 1997, Intel Corporation decided to o⁄shore part of its production of microprocessors
to a $300 million manufacturing plant in Costa Rica, it also decided to keep full control over
that facility, which it wholly owns. Conversely, Nike also relies on o⁄shore manufacturing but
instead subcontracts the production of its products to independent producers in Thailand,
Indonesia, Cambodia, Vietnam, and other low-wage countries, while keeping within ￿rm
boundaries only the design and marketing stages of production.
As we will illustrate below there are many instances in which the internalization decision,
just as other organizational decisions, will a⁄ect the mapping between factors of production
and ￿nal goods. At the same time, a growing body of empirical work documents that the
internalization decision of multinational ￿rms is very far from random, in the sense that the
relative prevalence of foreign insourcing versus foreign outsourcing is systematically related
to certain ￿rm, industry and country characteristics. This warrants some explanation. In
general, data on the ownership structure of ￿rms is hard to come by.17 Fortunately for
international trade economists, any exchange of goods or services that crosses a political
border is instantly recorded in government statistics. Furthermore, these statistical records
often include information on whether the parties transacting the good or service are related
15Yeaple (2003a) and Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2005) empirically test this ￿ vertical￿view of MNEs.
Of course, in the real world, we observe ￿rms undertaking multinational activity due to a combination of
horizontal and vertical forces. Yeaple (2003b), Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006), and Ekholm, Forslid,
and Markusen (2007) all study rich theoretical frameworks that unveil interesting complementarities between
these two forms of MNE expansion.
16See Helpman (1984) and Markusen and Venables (2000) for particularly lucid discussions of the e⁄ects
on the pattern of trade and factor prices. Ramondo (2007) or Garetto (2008) provide quantitative exercises
attempting to measure the welfare consequences of MNE-induced technology di⁄usion.
17This partly explains why the most satisfactory empirical tests of alternative theories of the ￿rm have
relied on data on very speci￿c industries.
14or not. In the former case, an instance of intra￿rm trade occurs, while in the latter case we
have inter￿rm or arm￿ s-length trade. The share of intra￿rm trade in world trade is quite
large (roughly 1/3): for the case of the United States, it represents close to 50% of imports
and over one-third of exports. Going back to the systematic patterns mentioned above,
what the literature has unveiled is that the share of intra￿rm trade in total trade varies
substantially across industries and countries, and that a signi￿cant share of this variation
can be explained by certain key characteristics. For instance, Antr￿s (2003) reports that
simple measures of R&D and capital intensity can explain a large fraction (almost 75%) of
the cross-industry variation in the share of intra￿rm imports in total U.S. imports.18
These and other stylized facts have motivated a recent wave of theoretical work attempt-
ing to shed light on the internalization decision of multinational ￿rms. The main unifying
theme of this literature is the departure from the classical assumption of complete contract-
ing. As is well-known (at least since Coase, 1937), ￿rm boundaries are indeterminate in
a world in which transactions are governed by comprehensive contracts that specify (in an
enforceable way) the course of action to be taken in any possible contingency that the con-
tracting parties may encounter. In order to shed light on the internalization decision, this
new literature on multinational ￿rms and outsourcing has thus borrowed from the theoretical
literature on ￿rm boundaries and incomplete contracts (c.f., Williamson, 1975, 1985, Gross-
man and Hart, 1986), and has developed ways to incorporate these contracting frameworks
into general equilibrium models. These developments have proved fruitful in explaining the
observed systematic patterns in the intra￿rm component of trade, and have also been in-
￿ uential in the study of how contractual frictions generally a⁄ect the workings of general
equilibrium models, as described in the next section.19
The ￿rst applications of incomplete contracting to open-economy setups adopted the
so-called transaction-cost approach of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975, 1985). This
approach describes certain contractual frictions that naturally emerge in arm￿ s-length trans-
actions when contracts are incomplete. Williamson, in particular, formalized how these con-
tractual gaps (and the associated renegotiation or ￿ ￿ne-tuning￿of contracts) would create in-
e¢ ciencies in situations in which the parties involved in a transaction undertake relationship-
speci￿c investments or use relationship-speci￿c assets.20 Essentially, speci￿city implies that,
18Similar results are reported in Yeaple (2006), Nunn and Tre￿ er (2008), and Bernard et al. (2008), who
all use more detailed datasets than Antr￿s (2003) and unveil further stylized facts.
19In some sense, the stylized facts on intra￿rm trade provided prima facie evidence of the importance
of incomplete contracting in the real world (how else could one explain those facts?), and this has fostered
a burgeoning literature studying organizational choices of ￿rms that transcend the internalization decision
(see the next section).
20A relationship-speci￿c asset or investment is one whose value is higher inside that particular relationship
than outside of it.
15at the renegotiation stage, parties cannot costlessly switch to alternative trading partners
and are partially locked into a bilateral relationship. The combination of bilateral bargain-
ing and sunk costs was shown to potentially generate ex-post ine¢ ciencies (e.g., ine¢ cient
termination or execution of the contract) as well as ex-ante or hold-up ine¢ ciencies (e.g.,
suboptimal provision of relationship-speci￿c investments). An important limitation of the
transaction-cost approach is that it has very little to say about the costs of intra￿rm trans-
actions. If the market system is so imperfect, why is there not one big ￿rm in the world
integrating the production of all goods? The transaction-cost approach simply posits the
existence of an exogenous governance cost of running an integrated structure.
An early application of the transaction-cost approach to international economics is o⁄ered
by Ethier (1986). In Ethier￿ s view, the main di⁄erence between transacting within the
boundaries of multinational ￿rms and transacting at arm￿ s length is that, in the latter
case, headquarters cannot o⁄er quality-contingent contracts to downstream producers or
distributors. As a result, headquarters cannot always device a contract that ensures ex-post
e¢ ciency and extracts all surplus from their contracting partners. In those situations, the
headquarters may be better o⁄ integrating the downstream producer. Interestingly, when
solving for the general equilibrium of the model, Ethier (1986) ￿nds that integration is more
attractive when di⁄erences in relative factor endowments between countries are small. This
result contrasts with that obtained by Helpman (1984) and nicely illustrates how a micro-
founded model of the integration decision can radically a⁄ect the predictions emanating from
models of the international organization of production.
McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002) o⁄er alternative general-equilibrium
formalizations of the transaction-cost approach which instead emphasize ex-ante or hold-
up ine¢ ciencies. In their frameworks, suppliers undertake relationship-speci￿c investments
that enhance the value of a good sold by a ￿nal-good producer. The key transaction-cost
assumption in these models is that the ￿nal-good producer can only contractually commit
to trade with the supplier at a stipulated price when it vertically integrates it. In the
case of outsourcing, the ￿nal-good producer will thus have every incentive to hold up the
supplier at the ex-post bargaining stage by o⁄ering him a relatively low remuneration for
the already-sunk investment. Anticipating this ex-post hold up, the supplier will ex-ante
choose to provide an ine¢ cient level of investment. Although vertical integration entails an
exogenous cost, it may be optimal when the hold-up ine¢ ciencies are large enough. In any
case, note that the organizational decision of whether or not to integrate suppliers a⁄ects
the equilibrium mapping between inputs and ￿nal goods.
The most interesting results in McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002)
arise when solving for the industry equilibrium of their models, in which a ￿rm￿ s decision
16to vertically integrate its supplier is shown to potentially exert a negative externality on
the remaining non-integrated bilateral relationships by thinning the market for inputs.21
As a result of these external e⁄ects, their models can feature multiple equilibria with a
pervasiveness of di⁄erent organizational forms (or industry systems) in ex-ante identical
countries or industries. They can also explain why trade opening, by thickening the market
for inputs, may well lead to a worldwide move towards more disintegrated industrial systems,
thus increasing world welfare and leading to gains from trade quite di⁄erent from those
emphasized in traditional trade theory.22 In other words, the endogenous organizational
choices of ￿rms can have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the characteristics of an economy￿ s response
to a trade liberalization process.23
As mentioned above, the transaction-cost approach to the theory of the ￿rm is silent on
the sources of costs of vertical integration. In their seminal paper on the property-rights
theory of the ￿rm, Grossman and Hart (1986) argue that it is not satisfactory to assume
that the contractual frictions that plague the relationship between two nonintegrated ￿rms
disappear when these ￿rms integrate. After all, inside ￿rms contracts are incomplete, agents
are opportunistic, and it is not clear why integration would change the relationship-speci￿city
of investments. What de￿nes then the boundaries of the ￿rm? The property-rights approach
posits that ownership is a source of power when contracts are incomplete. More speci￿cally,
when parties encounter contingencies that were not foreseen in the initial contract, the
owner of physical assets (e.g., machines, buildings, inventories, patents, copyrights) has these
residual rights of control and can decide on the use of these assets that maximizes his payo⁄
at the possible expense of that of the integrated party. Grossman and Hart (1986) then
show that in the presence of relationship-speci￿c investments, these considerations lead to a
theory of the boundaries of the ￿rm in which both the bene￿ts and the costs of integration are
endogenous. In particular, vertical integration entails endogenous costs because it reduces
the incentives of the integrated ￿rm to make investments that are partially speci￿c to the
integrating ￿rm, thereby lowering the overall surplus of the relationship.
21The mechanism in the two papers is, however, quite di⁄erent. In McLaren (2000), a thinner market for
inputs reduces the ex-post payo⁄ of suppliers and exacerbates the hold-up problem. The e⁄ect in Grossman
and Helpman (2002) is instead mediated by a search friction (which again only appears under outsourcing):
a thinner market for inputs reduces the probability of ￿nding a match (when the matching function features
increasing returns to scale) and this reduces the attractivenes of outsourcing for the remaining non-integrated
pairs.
22This result is explicitly derived by McLaren (2000). The Grossman and Helpman (2002) setup has been
extended in subsequent work by Grossman and Helpman (2003, 2005). Helpman (2006) o⁄ers an overview
of these papers.
23Another organizational decision of ￿rms in the McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002)
papers is the choice by suppliers of the degree to which they customize their intermediate products to their
intended buyers. See also Qiu and Spencer (2002) and Chen and Feenstra (2008) for related work.
17The property-rights approach has been applied to international trade environments,
among others, by Antr￿s (2003) and Antr￿s and Helpman (2004, 2008). These papers
envision an incomplete-contracting world in which both ￿nal-good producers and suppliers
(who may be located in a di⁄erent country) undertake non-contractible, relationship-speci￿c
investments that enhance value. The situation is thus one of double-sided hold-up and leads
to suboptimal investments by both types of producers. As in Grossman and Hart (1986),
vertical integration does not a⁄ect the space of contracts: it simply entails a stronger bar-
gaining power for the ￿nal-good producer in its negotiations with the supplying division.
The key partial equilibrium result in these papers is that vertical integration is only optimal
when the elasticity of output (or sales) with respect to the ￿nal-good producer￿ s noncon-
tractible investments is large relative to the elasticity of output (or sales) with respect to the
supplier￿ s noncontractible investments. In other words, integration dominates outsourcing in
￿ headquarter-intensive￿industries, but the converse is true in industries with low-headquarter
intensity (or ￿ component-intensive￿industries, to use the terminology in Antr￿s and Help-
man, 2004).
Antr￿s (2003) embeds this structure in a general equilibrium model of international trade
featuring increasing returns, product di⁄erentiation and monopolistic competition (c.f., Help-
man and Krugman, 1985). He argues that, in practice, non-contractible investments carried
out by ￿nal-good producers are likely to be more capital-intensive than those undertaken by
supplying ￿rms (see his paper for evidence). As a result, the model delivers a positive asso-
ciation between capital intensity and the attractiveness of integration. In the open-economy
model, this in turn produces a positive correlation, at the industry level, between capital
intensity and the share of intra￿rm trade in world trade, which is one of the stylized facts
mentioned above.24 Furthermore, when solving for the general equilibrium of the model,
the model also predicts a positive correlation between a country￿ s relative capital abundance
and the share of intra￿rm exports in its total exports to any country, a prediction for which
Antr￿s (2003) again ￿nds strong support.
Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) develop a property-rights theory of the multinational ￿rm
that allows for intraindustry heterogeneity in productivity and for di⁄erential ￿xed costs
across di⁄erent organizational models, as in Melitz (2003) or Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple
(2004). As a result, their model delivers equilibria featuring multiple organizational forms
within an industry. Independently of the assumptions on ￿xed costs, the framework continues
to predict a relative prevalence of foreign insourcing (or FDI) over outsourcing in relatively
24The fact that the share of intra￿rm imports in total U.S. imports is also signi￿cantly positively correlated
with R&D intensity can also be explained by the property-rights approach, as R&D intensity is another
natural proxy for ￿ headquarter intensity￿ .
18headquarter intensive industries. Furthermore, under the natural assumption that ￿xed costs
are larger when sourcing in foreign countries than when doing so within ￿rm boundaries,
the model predicts that only the most productive ￿rms in an industry should be expected
to vertically integrate their foreign suppliers. Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) study the relative
prevalence of di⁄erent organizational forms and derive predictions that go well beyond those
derived in Antr￿s (2003) and that open the door for more complete empirical studies of
the characteristics of the international organization of production. Antr￿s and Helpman
(2008) further extend the framework to allow for partial contractibility of investments and
show that, contrary to what would have been predicted by a transaction-cost theory of the
multinational ￿rm, improvements in contractibility in a country can actually lead to increase
in the prevalence of FDI (over outsourcing) in this country.
We have so far focused on an overview of the key theoretical contributions to the literature
on contractual frictions and multinational ￿rm boundaries. Recent e⁄orts have been directed
towards the development of empirical tests of the property-rights model of the multinational
￿rm, as exempli￿ed by Feenstra and Hanson (2005), Yeaple (2006), Defever and Toubal
(2007), Tomiura (2007), Bernard et al. (2008) and Nunn and Tre￿ er (2008). All these papers
focus, however, on testing particular predictions of particular variants of the property-rights
model, rather than o⁄ering a structural test of the model. Furthermore, as of current time,
there has been no satisfactory attempt to properly deal with a set of econometric biases
(identi￿ed by the same model) that will arise when attempting to test the model.25 In our
view, future research e⁄orts should be aimed in that direction.
Another potentially fruitful area for future research relates to the study of the e⁄ects of
the non-appropriable nature of knowledge on the internalization decision. Past research has
arguably focused too much on hold-up ine¢ ciencies as the main drivers of the internalization
decision. Our example of the choice of Intel to fully internalize their operations in Costa
Rica is probably better explained in terms of a fear of technological expropriation than
in terms of a double-sided hold-up problem. An early attempt to incorporate a notion of
non-appropriable knowledge into a general equilibrium model of the multinational ￿rm was
developed by Ethier and Markusen (1996), who adopted a transaction-cost approach in which
FDI avoided any type of knowledge dissipation. A more satisfactory approach would entail
the application of the property-rights approach and of the notion of ￿ access￿developed by
Rajan and Zingales (2001).
25For example, the property-rights model predicts that capital intensity and R&D intensity will be higher
in integrated ￿rms relative to non-integrated ￿rms. The observed positive correlation between the share of
intra￿rm trade and capital and R&D intensity at the industry level could thus be partly explained by these
forces, rather than by the selection of ￿rms into integration or outsourcing.
195 Contractual Frictions and Other Organizational De-
cisions
The papers surveyed in the previous section focus on the internalization decision as the main
organizational choice of ￿rms. The systematic patterns observed in the outsourcing decisions
of ￿rms suggest that we live in a world of incomplete contracting. A natural question to ask
is then: how do contractual frictions a⁄ect the other organizational choices of ￿rms? And
how do these choices interact with international trade? The available literature has only
provided tentative answers to these questions.
Soon after the development of the ￿ complete￿theories of multinational ￿rm boundaries
described above, the literature acknowledged that imperfect contracting could a⁄ect not only
the ownership structure of ￿rms but also their geographical location, hence creating a link
with the literature on fragmentation reviewed in section 2. Antr￿s (2005) argues that the
incomplete nature of contracts governing international transactions limits the extent to which
the production process can be fragmented across borders. In a dynamic, general-equilibrium
Ricardian model of North-South trade, he shows that the incompleteness of international
contracts naturally leads to the emergence of Vernon-type product cycles, with new goods
being initially manufactured in North (where product development takes place), and only
later (when the goods are mature) is manufacturing carried out in South.26
Acemoglu et al. (2007), Costinot (2007), Levchenko (2007), and Nunn (2007) argue that
contractual frictions can shape the location of production and thus the structure of trade
￿ ows even in models without any fragmentation of production. In particular, to the extent
that contractual frictions lead to organizational choices by ￿rms that a⁄ect the mapping
between inputs and outputs di⁄erentially across sectors, imperfect contracting will be a
source of comparative advantage: countries with well-functioning contractual institutions will
be net exporters of ￿ contract-intensive￿goods. These papers di⁄er in their proposed measure
of contract-dependence and in other particulars aspects. Acemoglu et al. (2007) build a
micro-founded model of technology adoption (another organizational decision of ￿rms) in
the presence of incomplete contracting, and show that greater contractual incompleteness
leads to the adoption of less advanced technologies, with the e⁄ect being more pronounced
when there is greater complementary among intermediate inputs. Costinot (2007) develops
a model where productivity is determined by the division of labor, and the extent of the
latter is a⁄ected by the contractual environment and by the complexity of production; he
26Antr￿s (2005) also draws the boundaries of multinational ￿rms and shows that the model gives rise to a
new version of the product cycle in which manufacturing is shifted to the South ￿rst within ￿rm boundaries,
and only at a later stage to independent ￿rms in the South. See Puga and Tre￿ er (2007) for another
theoretical exploration of the links between contractual incompleteness and product cycles
20then derives the result that countries with better contracting institutions have comparative
advantage in more complex sectors (for which he ￿nds support in the data). Levchenko (2007)
and Nunn (2007) also provide empirical evidence that a country￿ s comparative advantage is
partly determined by contracting institutions, and suggest measures of contract dependence
related to the costs of contracting between upstream and downstream producers.27
Another important organizational decision of ￿rms concerns the allocation of decision
rights among employees. In the presence of noncontractible e⁄ort decisions by workers,
managers face a trade-o⁄ between granting decision rights to workers or keeping these to
themselves. The former option has the bene￿t of providing workers with ￿ initiative,￿which
may lead to higher e⁄ort, but delegation may result in decisions that are not necessarily op-
timal from the point of view of the manager. Avoiding delegation (i.e., exerting ￿ authority￿ )
tends to inhibit the initiative of workers but entails more control over the course of produc-
tion. As a result of these forces, the reduced-form mapping between factors of production
and goods is a⁄ected by the allocation of decision rights among agents. This trade-o⁄ was
￿rst formalized by Aghion and Tirole (1997) and has been applied to general-equilibrium
frameworks by Puga and Tre￿ er (2002) and Marin and Verdier (2008a,b).
In certain situations, managers may have access to simpler ways to provide incentives to
workers. For instance, the remuneration of a worker can be made conditional on an observable
(and veri￿able) variable that is in turn a⁄ected by the worker￿ s e⁄ort decision. Holmstrom
(1982) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) have emphasized the role of contingent rewards
in in￿ uencing workers￿incentives. A much less understood question is how trade liberaliza-
tion a⁄ects the ￿ slope￿of this incentive scheme and how this endogenous change a⁄ects the
response of the economy to trade opening. Grossman and Helpman (2004) and Vogel (2007)
provide preliminary answers to these questions but much more work is required in this area.
A ￿nal potentially fruitful avenue of research concerns the role of trade policy in a world
where ￿rms make organizational decisions under incomplete contracts. A ￿rst attempt in
this direction is provided by Antr￿s and Staiger (2008), who study the implications of the fact
that in transactions involving signi￿cant ex-ante customization of goods, any renegotiation of
the contract will lead to a price that is determined by bilateral bargaining and not by market
clearing conditions, as in traditional theory. As a result, they show that trade policy changes
in local prices can have spillover e⁄ects in other countries, even when they hold constant
international (untaxed) prices, thus leading to predictions quite distinct from those of the
traditional terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements. Conconi, Legros and Newman (2009)
27Levchenko (2007) also develops an interesting theoretical model that illustrates how contractual incom-
pleteness can signi￿cantly impact the workings of a general equilibrium model. For instance, in his model,
the institutionally-weak country may not gain from trade, and factor prices may actually diverge as a result
of trade.
21have studied additional implications of incomplete contracting for the design of optimal trade
policy.
6 Concluding Remarks
In reviewing the literature on organizations and trade we have, inevitably, disregarded many
related papers and topics in order to give the reader a summary of what we believe are
the main recent advances in our understanding of the role of organizations in trade. We
have divided the literature into four sections, but we could have added several more. In
particular, we could have included a discussion of the literature on heterogenous ￿rms that
emanated from the seminal work of Melitz (2003).28 We could have also reviewed the recent
literature on multiproduct ￿rms (e.g. Bernard, Redding and Shott, 2006).29 As explained
in the introduction, our guiding principle was that these topics, although important, do
not deal with the way production is organized, but rather focus on what is produced and
who produces it. These are obviously important questions, but we had to draw the line
somewhere and we are undoubtedly biased towards our own idiosyncratic interests.
The discussion of the di⁄erent strands of the literature has allowed us to outline some
possible ideas for future research and what we view as ￿ gaps￿in the current understanding of
this topic. More generally, there are four large areas in which we would particularly welcome
more research.
First, most of the literature on organizations and trade is static. There are only a few
papers that study the dynamic impact of the international organization of production on the
evolution of knowledge, the distribution of skills, and other country-speci￿c characteristics.
Could the fragmentation of production lead to skill upgrading in developing countries? How
will the pattern of specialization evolve given this type of learning? Will global production
chains imply convergence in income levels? All these are questions that have been mostly
relegated to a few lines in the discussion of static frameworks. Theoretical work in this area
is badly needed.
Second, although the literature has incorporated many organizational theories into trade
frameworks, there are many alternative theories of organizations that are still awaiting a gen-
eral equilibrium implementation. These alternative approaches could also yield important
insights into the way the international organization of production a⁄ects aggregate outcomes.
Perhaps even more important is to make an e⁄ort to synthesize what are the robust economic
predictions and e⁄ects of all these di⁄erent organizational theories that we need to incor-
28See the survey in Helpman (2006) who does cover this literature.
29See the survey in Bernard, et. al. (2007).
22porate into trade frameworks. We may believe that the e¢ cient use of information drives
organizational structure or that ￿ authority￿and ￿ delegation￿are the key elements, but can
we obtain common robust aggregate predictions from these theories for trade?
We have made an e⁄ort to discuss the instances in which the theories we outlined in this
survey are consistent with particular empirical facts or are motivated by them. However, even
though some suggestive evidence is available to contrast these theories, most of empirical
work takes a reduced-form approach in which only the predictions of the theory on the sign
of some correlations are contrasted with the data. Very little work has been devoted to
structurally estimate the models we have discussed in this survey. This is partly due to the
stylized nature of some of these theories, and partly due to the under-utilization of this type
of empirical techniques in the international trade ￿eld. The literature on heterogenous ￿rms
has taken more advantage of this type of methodology with extremely interesting, and much
more robust, results. We hope to see the evolution of similar empirical work on the questions
we have discussed in this survey.
Finally, although the literature on organizations and trade has been extremely concerned
with matching positive features of reality (e.g., the share of intra￿rm trade, the volume of
trade, the evolution of wage inequality), it has been much less concerned with the normative
and policy implications of changes in the international organization of production. A lot
more work is needed to quantitatively assess the magnitude of the observed changes, their
welfare impact and, if necessary, the possible policy responses.
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